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Abstract— The problem of private information “leakage” (in-
advertently or by malicious design) from the myriad large
centralized searchable data repositories drives the need for an
analytical framework that quantifies unequivocally how safe
private data can be (privacy) while still providing useful benefit
(utility) to multiple legitimate information consumers. Rate
distortion theory is shown to be a natural choice to develop
such a framework which includes the following: modeling of
data sources, developing application independent utility and
privacy metrics, quantifying utility-privacy tradeoffs irrespective
of the type of data sources or the methods of providing privacy,
developing a side-information model for dealing with questions of
external knowledge, and studying a successive disclosure problem
for multiple query data sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information technology and electronic communications
have been rapidly applied to almost every sphere of human
activity, including commerce, medicine and social network-
ing. The concomitant emergence of myriad large centralized
searchable data repositories has made “leakage” of private
information such as medical data, credit card information, or
social security numbers via data correlation (inadvertently or
by malicious design) an important and urgent societal problem.
Unlike the well-studied secrecy problem (e.g., [1]–[3]) in
which the protocols or primitives make a sharp distinction
between secret and non-secret data, in the privacy problem,
disclosing data provides informational utility while enabling
possible loss of privacy at the same time. In fact, in the
course of a legitimate transaction, a user can learn some public
information, which is allowed and needs to be supported, and
at the same time also learn/infer private information, which
needs to be prevented. Thus every user is (potentially) also
an adversary. This drives the need for a unified analytical
framework that can tell us unequivocally and precisely how
safe private data can be (privacy) while still providing useful
benefit (utility) to multiple legitimate information consumers.
It has been noted that utility and privacy are competing
goals: perfect privacy can be achieved by publishing nothing
at all, but this has no utility; perfect utility can be obtained
by publishing the data exactly as received, but this offers
no privacy [4]. Utility of a data source is potentially (but
not necessarily) degraded when it is restricted or modified
to uphold privacy requirements. The central problem of this
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paper is a precise quantification of the tradeoff between the
privacy needs of the respondents (individuals represented by
the data) and the utility of the sanitized (published) data for
any data source.
Though the problem of privacy and information leakage has
been studied for several decades by multiple research commu-
nities (e.g., [4]–[8] and the references therein), the proposed
solutions have been both heuristic and application-specific.
The recent groundbreaking theory of differential privacy [9],
[10] from the theoretical computer science community is the
first universal model that applies to any statistical database
irrespective of application or content. However, the crucial
challenges of an analytic characterization of both a utility
metric and the privacy-utility tradeoff remains unaddressed.
We seek to address these challenges using tools and techniques
from information theory.
Rate distortion theory is a natural choice to study the utility-
privacy tradeoff; utility can be quantified via fidelity which
in turn is related to distortion and privacy can be quantified
via equivocation. Our key insight is captured in the following
theorem we present in this paper: for a data source with private
and public data and desired utility level, maximum privacy
for the private data is achieved by minimizing the information
disclosure rate sufficient to satisfy the desired utility for the
public data. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
observation that tightly relates utility and privacy. I
In a sparsely referenced paper [11] from three decades ago,
Yamamoto developed the tradeoff between rate, distortion,
and equivocation for a specific and simple source model. In
this paper, we show via the above summarized theorem that
Yamamoto’s formalism can be translated into the language
of data disclosure. Furthermore, we develop a framework
which allows us to model data sources, specifically databases,
develop application independent utility and privacy metrics,
quantify the fundamental bounds on the utility-privacy trade-
offs, and develop a side-information model for dealing with
questions of external knowledge, and study the utility-privacy
tradeoffs for multiple query data sources as a successive
disclosure problem. The final problem arises in the following
context: real-world data sources are in general interactive, that
is, they allow users multiple interactions (queries). However,
modeling this analytically is particularly challenging. Our
framework can handle the non-interactive (single query) case
for any given utility and privacy requirements. In this paper, we
study the interactive case as a successive disclosure problem
modeled along the information-theoretic successive refinement
problem.
II. THE DATABASE PRIVACY PROBLEM
A. Problem Definition
While the problem of quantifying the utility/privacy prob-
lem applies to all types of data sources, we start our study with
databases because they are highly structured and historically
better studied than other types of sources. A database is a
table (matrix) whose rows represent the individual entries and
whose columns represent the attributes of each entry [5]. For
example, the attributes of each entry in a healthcare database
typically include name, address, social security number (SSN),
gender, and a collection of medical information and each entry
contains the information pertaining to an individual. Messages
from a user to a database are called queries and, in general,
result in some numeric or non-numeric information from the
database termed the response.
The goal of privacy protection is to ensure that, to the
extent possible, the user’s knowledge is not increased beyond
strict predefined limits by interacting with the database. The
goal of utility provision is, generally, to maximize the amount
of information that the user can receive. Depending on the
relationship between attributes, and the distribution of the
actual data, a response may contain information that can be
inferred beyond what is explicitly included in the response.
The privacy policy defines the information that should not
revealed explicitly or by inference to the user and depends on
the context and the application. For example, in a database
on health statistics, attributes such as name and SSN may
be considered private data, whereas in a state motor vehicles
database only the SSN is considered private. The challenge
for privacy protection is to design databases such that any
response does not reveal information contravening the privacy
policy.
B. Current Approaches and Metrics
The approaches considered in the literature have centered
on perturbation (also called sanitization) which encompasses
a general class of database modification techniques that ensure
that a user only interacts with a modified database that is de-
rived from the original (e.g.: [4], [6]–[8]). Most of the current
perturbation-based approaches are heuristic and application-
specific and often focus on additive noise approaches.
Perturbation techniques depend on whether the database is
considered interactive (i.e. whether the user can issue more
queries after seeing earlier responses) or non-interactive [9].
In the non-interactive model, the database is published after
a sanitization process in which personal identifiers are elimi-
nated and the data is perturbed using one of many possible
input perturbation approaches; alternately in the interactive
model, the database adds noise to the response based on a
data model.
In order to quantify the privacy and utility afforded by a data
source, metrics are critical. The concept of k-anonymity pro-
posed by Sweeney [7] captures the intuitive notion of privacy
that every individual entry should be indistinguishable from
(k−1) other entries for some large value of k. More recently,
researchers in the data mining community have proposed to
quantify the privacy loss resulting from data disclosure as the
mutual information between attribute values in the original
and perturbed data sets, both modeled as random variables
[8]. Finally, motivated by cryptographic models, the concept
of differential privacy from theoretical computer science [9],
[10] has created a universal model for privacy which measures
the risk of loss of privacy to an individual whose data is in
a statistical database. However, this work as well the others
described above do not propose a companion universal utility
metric that can be guaranteed along with privacy.
C. Privacy vs. Utility
While the privacy problem has been studied by multiple
communities using multiple approaches, the companion utility
problem has not been studied as analytically and exhaustively
except in the context of specific applications. Indeed, most
discussions of privacy assume an implicit utility that is left
unstated or unmeasured. Utility of a data source is, by ne-
cessity, a relative concept and is measured from the point
of view of the user: utility is maximal when the user gets
full information flow and reduces when the flow of certain
information is reduced either by restriction or the addition
of noise. The general concept of utility as a measure of the
approximation to an underlying (but undisclosed) quantity is
a fertile area of research (e.g.: [12], [13]). However, these
measures have not been customized for the context of privacy
enhancement. Heuristic measures of utility in the context of
privacy have been proposed (e.g.: [4]) but they do not yield
a general notion of utility. In our proposed work, we will
use a working definition of utility as the measure of the
distance or divergence (using suitably chosen metrics such
as Euclidean or Kullback-Leibler divergence) between the
original and sanitized databases.
III. AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH
A. Model for Databases
Circumventing the semantic issue: In general, utility and
privacy metrics tend to be application specific. Focusing our
efforts on developing an analytical model, we propose to
capture a canonical database model and representative abstract
metrics. Such a model will circumvent the classic privacy
issues related to the semantics of the data by assuming that
there exist forward and reverse maps of the data set to the
proposed abstract format (for e.g., a string of bits or a sequence
of real values). Such mappings are often implicitly assumed in
the privacy literature [4], [8], [9]; our motivation for making it
explicit is to separate the semantic issues from the abstraction
and apply Shannon-theoretic techniques.
Model: Our proposed model focuses on large databases with
K attributes per entry. Let Xk ∈ Xk be a random variable
denoting the kth attribute, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, and let X ≡
(X1, X2, . . . , XK). A database d with n rows is a sequence
of n independent observations of X with the distribution
pX (x) = pX1X2...XK (x1, x2, . . . , xK) (1)
which is assumed to be known to the designers of the database.
Our assumption of row independence in (1) is justified because
correlation in databases is typically across attributes and not
across entries. We write Xn = (Xn1 , Xn2 , . . . , XnK) to denote
the n independent observations of X. This database model
is universal in the sense that most practical databases can be
mapped to this model.
A joint distribution in (1) models the fact that the attributes
in general are correlated and can reveal information about one
another. In addition to the revealed information, a user of a
database can have access to correlated side information from
other information sources. We model the side-information as
an n-length sequence Zn which is correlated with the database
entries via a joint distribution pXZ (x,z) .
Public and private variables: We consider a general model
in which some attributes need to be kept private while the
source can reveal a function of some or all of the attributes.
We write Kr and Kh to denote sets of private (subscript h
for hidden) and public (subscript r for revealed) attributes,
respectively, such that Kr ∪ Kh = K ≡{1, 2, . . . ,K}. We
further denote the corresponding collections of public and
private attributes by Xr ≡ {Xk}k∈Kr and Xh ≡ {Xk}k∈Kh ,
respectively. Our notation allows for an attribute to be both
public and private; this is to account for the fact that a database
may need to reveal a function of an attribute while keeping
the attribute itself private. In general, a database can choose
to keep public (or private) one or more attributes (K > 1).
Irrespective of the number of private attributes, a non-zero
utility results only when the database reveals an appropriate
function of some or all of its attributes.
Special cases: For K = 1, the lone attribute of each
entry (row) is both public and private, and thus, we have
X ≡ Xr ≡ Xh. Such a model is appropriate for data mining
[8] and census [4], [6] data sets in which utility generally is
achieved by revealing a function of every entry of the database
while simultaneously ensuring that no entry is completely
revealed. For K = 2 and Kh ∪Kr = K and Kh ∩Kr = ∅, we
obtain the Yamamoto model in [11].
B. Metrics: The Privacy and Utility Principle
Even though utility and privacy measures tend to be specific
to the application, there is a fundamental principle that unifies
all these measures in the abstract domain. The aim of a
privacy-preserving database is to provide some measure of
utility to the user while at the same time guaranteeing a
measure of privacy for the entries in the database.
A user perceives the utility of a perturbed database to be
high as long as the response is similar to the response of the
original database; thus, the utility is highest of an original
(unpertubed) database and goes to zero when the perturbed
database is completely unrelated to the original database. Ac-
cordingly, our utility metric is an appropriately chosen average
‘distance’ function between the original and the perturbed
databases. Privacy, on the other hand, is maximized when the
perturbed response is completely independent of the data. Our
privacy metric measures the difficulty of extracting any private
information from the response, i.e., the amount of uncertainty
or equivocation about the private attributes given the response.
C. A Privacy-Utility Tradeoff Model
We now propose a privacy-utility model for databases.
Our primary contribution is demonstrating the equivalence
between the database privacy problem and a source coding
problem with additional privacy constraints. For our abstract
universal database model, sanitization is thus a problem of
mapping a set of database entries to a different set subject to
specific utility and privacy requirements. Our notation below
relies on this abstraction.
Recall that a database d with n rows is an instantiation of
X
n
. Thus, we will henceforth refer to a real database d as
an input sequence and to the corresponding sanitized database
(SDB) d′ as an output sequence. When the user has access to
side information, the reconstructed sequence at the user will
in general be different from the SDB sequence.
Our coding scheme consists of an encoder FE which is
a mapping from the set of all input sequences (i.e., all
databases d picked from an underlying distribution) to a set of
indices W ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,M} and an associated table of output
sequences (each of which is a d′) with a one-to-one mapping
to the set of indices given by
FE : (X
n
1 ×X
n
2 × . . .× X
n
k )k∈Kenc →W ≡ {SDBk}
M
k=1
(2)
where Kr ⊆ Kenc ⊆ K and M = 2nR is the number of
output (sanitized) sequences created from the set of all input
sequences. The encoding rate R is the number of bits per entry
(without loss of generality, we assume n entries in d and d′) of
the sanitized database. The encoding FE in (2) includes both
public and private attributes in order to model the general case
in which the sanitization depends on a subset of all attributes.
A user with a view of the SDB (i.e., an index w ∈ W for
every d) and with access to side information Zn, whose entries
Zi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, take values in the alphabet Z , reconstructs
the database d′ via the mapping
FD :W ×Z
n →
{
xˆ
n
r,m
}M
m=1
∈
(∏
k∈Kr
Xˆnk
)
(3)
where Xˆnr = FD (FE (Xn)).
A database may need to satisfy multiple utility constraints
for different (disjoint) subsets of attributes, and thus, we
consider a general framework with L ≥ 1 utility functions
that need to be satisfied. Relying on the distance based utility
principle, we model the lth utility, l = 1, 2, . . . , L, via the
requirement that the average distortion ∆l of a function fl of
the revealed variables is upper bounded, for some ǫ > 0, as
ul : ∆l ≡ E
[
1
n
∑n
i=1g
(
fl (Xr,i) , fl
(
Xˆr,i
))]
≤ Dl + ǫ,
l = 1, 2, . . . , L, (4)
where g (·, ·) denotes a distortion function, E is the ex-
pectation over the joint distribution of (Xr , Xˆr), and the
subscript i in Xr,i and Xˆr,i denotes the ith entry of Xnr and
Xˆ
n
r , respectively. Examples of distance-based distortion func-
tions include the Euclidean distance for Gaussian distributed
database entries, the Hamming distance for binary input and
output sequences, and the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) ‘distance’
comparing the input and output distributions.
Having argued that a quantifiable uncertainty captures the
privacy of a database, we model the uncertainty or equivo-
cation about the private variables using the entropy function
as
p : ∆p ≡
1
n
H (Xnh |W,Z
n) ≥ E − ǫ, (5)
i.e., we require the average number of uncertain bits per
dimension to be lower bounded by E. The case in which side
information is not available at the user is obtained by simply
setting Zn = 0 in (3) and (5). While our general problem
allows separate constraints on the privacy and utility, we show
later that for specific canonical databases (census and data
mining) a constraint on only one of them (utility or privacy)
suffices (see Corollary 6 in Section III-E).
The utility and privacy metrics in (4) and (5), respectively,
capture two aspects of our universal model: a) both represent
averages by computing the metrics across all database instan-
tiations d, and b) the metrics bound the average distortion
and privacy per entry. Thus, as the likelihood of the non-
typical sequences decreases exponentially with increasing n
(very large databases), these guarantees apply nearly uniformly
to all (typical) entries. Our general model also encompasses
the fact that the exact mapping from the distortion and
equivocation domains to the utility and privacy domains,
respectively, can depend on the application domain. We write
D ≡ (D1, D2, . . . , DL) and ∆ ≡ (∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆L). Based
on our notation thus far, we define the utility-privacy tradeoff
region as follows.
Definition 1: The utility-privacy tradeoff region T is the
set of all feasible utility-privacy tuples (D,E) for which
there exists a coding scheme (FE , FD) given by (2) and
(3), respectively, with parameters (n,M,∆,∆p) satisfying the
constraints in (4) and (5).
D. Equivalence of Utility-Privacy and Rate-Distortion-
Equivocation
We now present an argument for the equivalence of the
above utility-privacy tradeoff analysis with a rate-distortion-
equivocation analysis of the same source. For the database
source model described here, a classic lossy source coding
problem is defined as follows.
Definition 2: The set of tuples (R,D) is said to be feasible
(achievable) if there exists a coding scheme given by (2) and
(3) with parameters (n,M,∆) satisfying the constraints in (4)
and a rate constraint
M ≤ 2n(R+ǫ). (6)
When an additional privacy constraint in (5) is included,
the source coding problem becomes one of determining the
achievable rate-distortion-equivocation region defined as fol-
lows.
Definition 3: The rate-distortion-equivocation region R is
the set of all tuples (R,D,E) for which there exists a coding
scheme given by (2) and (3) with parameters (n,M,∆,∆p)
satisfying the constraints in (4), (5), and (6). The set of all
feasible distortion-equivocation tuples (D,E) is denoted by
RD−E , the equivocation-distortion function in the D-E plane
is denoted by Γ(D), and the distortion-equivocation function
which quantifies the rate as a function of both D and E is
denoted by R (D,E).
Thus, a rate-distortion-equivocation code is by definition a
(lossy) source code satisfying a set of distortion constraints
that achieves a specific privacy level for every choice of the
distortion tuple. In the following theorem, we present a basic
result capturing the precise relationship between T and R. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical result that
quantifies a tight relationship between utility and privacy. We
briefly sketch the proof here; details can be found in [14].
Theorem 4: For a database with a set of utility and privacy
metrics, the tightest utility-privacy tradeoff region T is the
distortion-equivocation region RD−E .
Proof: The crux of our argument is the fact that for any
feasible utility level D, choosing the minimum rate R (D),
ensures that the least amount of information is revealed about
the source via the reconstructed variables. This in turn ensures
that the maximum privacy of the private attributes is achieved
for that utility since, in general, the public and private variables
are correlated. For the same set of utility constraints, since
such a rate requirement is not a part of the utility-privacy
model, the resulting privacy achieved is at most as large as
that in RD−E (see Fig. 1(a)).
Implicit in the above argument is the fact that a utility-
privacy achieving code does not perform any better than a
rate-distortion-equivocation code in terms of achieving a lower
rate (given by log2M/n) for the same distortion and privacy
constraints. This is because if such a code exists then we can
always find an equivalent source coding problem for which
the code would violate Shannon’s source coding theorem
[15]. An immediate consequence of this is that a distortion-
constrained source code suffices to preserve a desired level of
privacy; in other words, the utility constraints require revealing
data which in turn comes at a certain privacy cost that
must be borne and vice-versa. We capture this observation
in Fig. 1(b) where we contrast existing privacy-exclusive and
utility-exclusive regimes (extreme points of the utility-privacy
tradeoff curve) with our more general approach of determining
the set of feasible utility-privacy tradeoff points.
From an information-theoretic perspective, the power of
Theorem 4 is that it allows us to study the larger problem
Distortion D
Equivocation E
Rate distortion:
( ) ( ,0)R D R D≡
( , )R D E
Privacy bound: ( )DΓ
Rate Bound: ( , )R D E
Feasible Distortion-Equivocation 
region .D E−R
maxD
Privacy p
Utility U
Distortion D
Privacy-ignorant
Region
Privacy-exclusive
Region (current art)
Our Approach:
Utility-Privacy 
Tradeoff Region
Equivocation E
(a): Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region (b): Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Region
Fig. 1. (a) Rate Distortion Equivocation Region; (b) Utility-Privacy Tradeoff Region.
of database utility-privacy tradeoffs in terms of a relatively
familiar problem of source coding with privacy constraints. As
noted previously, this problem has been studied for a specific
source model by Yamamoto and here we expand his elegant
analysis to arbitrary database models including those with side
information at the user.
E. Capturing the Effects of Side-Information
It has been illustrated that when a user has access to an
external data source (which is not part of the database under
consideration) the level of privacy that can be guaranteed
changes [7], [9]. We cast this problem in information-theoretic
terms as a side information problem.
In an extended version of this work [14], we have developed
the tightest utility-privacy tradeoff region for the three cases
of a) no side information (L = 1 case studied in [11]), b)
side information only at the user, and c) side information
at both the source (database) and the user. We present a
result for the case with side information at the user only
and for simplicity, we assume a single utility function, i.e.,
L = 1. The proof mimics that of source coding with side
information in [16] and therefore, involves the use of an
auxiliary random variable U . The proof also includes bounds
on the equivocation along the lines of those in [11, Appendix
1]. The following theorem defines the bounds on the region
R in Definition 3 via the functions Γ(D) and R(D,E) where
Γ(D) bounds the maximal achievable privacy and R(D,E)
is the minimal information rate (see Fig. 1(a)) for very large
databases (n→∞). The proof is omitted due to space and
can be found in [14].
Theorem 5: For a database with side information available
only at the user, the functions Γ(D) and R (D,E) and the
regions RD−E and R are given by
Γ (D) = sup
p(xr,xh)p(u|xr,xh)∈P(D)
H(Xh|UZ) (7)
R (D,E) = inf
p(xr,xh)p(u|xr,xh)∈P(D,E)
I(XhXr;U)− I(Z;U)
(8)
RD−E = {(D,E) : D ≥ 0, 0 ≤ E ≤ Γ (D)} (9)
R = {(R,D,E) : D ≥ 0, 0 ≤ E ≤ Γ (D) , R ≥ R (D,E)}
(10)
where P (D,E) is the set of all p(xr,xh, z)p(u|xr,xh) such
that E [d (Xr, g (U,Z))] ≤ D and H(Xh|UZ) ≥ E while
P (D) is defined as
P (D) ≡
⋃
H(Xh|XrZ)≤E≤H(Xh|Z)
P (D,E) . (11)
While Theorem 5 applies to a variety of database models, it
is extremely useful in quantifying the utility-privacy tradeoff
for the following special cases of interest.
i) The single database problem (i.e., no side information):
SDB is revealed. Here, we have Z = 0 and U = Xˆr, i.e.,
the reconstructed vectors seen by the user are the same as the
SDB vectors.
ii) Completely hidden private variables: Privacy is com-
pletely a function of the statistical relationship between pub-
lic, private, and side information data. The expression for
R(D,E) in (8) assumes the most general model of encoding
both the private and the public variables. When the private
variables can only be deduced from the revealed variables, i.e.,
Xh−Xr−U is a Markov chain, the expression for R(D,E) in
(8) will simplify to the Wyner-Ziv source coding formulation
[16], thus clearly demonstrating that the privacy of the hidden
variables is a function of both the correlation between the
hidden and revealed variables and the distortion constraint.
iii) Census and data mining problems without side in-
formation: Information rate completely determines privacy
achievable. For Z = 0, setting Xr = Xh ≡ X (such that
U = Xˆ), we obtain the census/data mining problem discussed
earlier. With this substitution, from Theorem 5, we have the
maximal achievable equivocation Γ(D) = H(X) − R(D),
where now R(D) ≡ R(D,E). Our analysis formalizes the
intuition in [8] for using the mutual information as an estimate
of the privacy lost. However in contrast to [8] in which the
underlying perturbation model is an additive noise model,
we assume a perturbation model most appropriate for the
input statistics, i.e., the stochastic relationship between the
output and input variables is chosen to minimize the rate of
information transfer. This fundamental result is captured in the
following corollary.
Corollary 6: For the special case of K = 1, i.e., Xr =
Xh ≡ X , the utility-privacy problem is completely defined by
a utility constraint since the maximum achievable equivocation
is directly obtainable from the minimal information transfer
rate.
F. A Successive Disclosure Problem
As mentioned earlier, databases can be broadly categorized
as non-interactive and interactive depending on whether the
data is sanitized once before publishing or repeatedly in
response to each query, respectively. For census and similar
statistical databases a one-shot sanitization is typical whereas
for more interactive databases multiple queries can lead to
multiple sanitizations.
Single-query model: The model and analysis proposed
in Sections III-A-III-D capture the non-interactive database
model and the resulting utility-privacy tradeoff region. For this
one-shot model, sanitization is determined by the choice of
the utility and privacy metrics defined a priori. In contrast to
existing approaches that are dominantly focused on additive
noise perturbations satisfying a large set of queries [17],
[18], our one-shot approach is independent of queries and
is designed to satisfy specific utility and privacy constraints.
Such a model is relevant for databases such as those with
medical and clinical data that may find repeated uses in the
future but with queries that cannot be predicted ahead of time
or which require query-independent strict sanitization prior to
interaction to ensure regulatory compliance (e.g., US HIPAA
privacy policies [19]).
Multiple-query model: For a large majority of data reposito-
ries, utility is a function of their usage and as such the problem
of addressing the utility-privacy tradeoffs in a multiple query
model is imperative. A side-effect of allowing multiple queries
is that a user can refine her query to learn more information
at each step, which in turn can lead to privacy breaches.
Our aim is to determine if a certain level of overall utility
can be guaranteed while preserving a desired overall privacy
threshold. In the absence of disclosure controls, a database
will typically respond to each query independently of the
previous queries. We seek to develop a model in which the
database is cognizant of current and past queries in responding
to future queries. To this end, we assume the existence of
a data collector that provides an interface for the user to
submit queries and collate the responses over multiple queries,
a common assumption in the multi-query literature [9], [10],
[18]. For this model, under the assumption that the user wishes
to obtain a refined view of the source, we propose to determine
whether a source can be successively disclosed, i.e., whether
a set of overall utility and privacy constraints can be satisfied
via multiple disclosures with increasing refinement at each
stage and without any information loss relative to an equivalent
single-shot model with the same overall utility and privacy
constraints.
This problem of successive disclosure has a natural rela-
tionship to a problem of successive refinement in information
theory, which pertains to determining whether successively
revealing data from a source with decreasing distortion at each
stage can ensure no rate loss relative to a one-shot approach
with the same final distortion [20]–[22]. We demonstrate this
analogy in Fig. 2 where, at the first stage, the user obtains
a specific view (denoted Xˆ1 of a source X) of the source
which in conjunction with the second stage provides a final
refined view Xˆ2. While the successive refinement problem is
to determine whether R2 = R (D2), the successive disclosure
problem is that of determining whether R2 = R (D2, E2)
where D2 < D1 and E2 < E1. As with the successive
refinement problem, our results can help determine the condi-
tions and relationships between the input and output sequences
under which a source can be disclosed successively.
Analogous to successive refinement, we start by studying a
multiple disclosure problem in which we seek to determine
the rates R0 and R1 at which the database responds with
distortion (utility) and privacy levels (D0, E0) and (D1, E1)
to two queries, respectively, such that a user using both query
responses can reconstruct a response at a distortion-privacy
level of (D2, E2). Analogous to the relationship between
multiple description and successive refinement, the successive
disclosure problem described here is a special case of the
multiple disclosure problem for which there is no rate loss,
i.e., R1 = R (D1, E1) and R0 +R1 = R (D2, E2).
While a detailed analysis of this problem can be found in
an extended version of this work [14], we now present two
example privacy problems for which the successive refinement
problem presents immediate insights on the effects of refined
disclosure. The two problems are privacy preservation in
census and data mining databases, and in both cases, we
briefly argue that the successive disclosure problem simplifies
to the successive refinement problem. Recall that in Corollary
6, we showed that the census and data mining problems are
special cases for which the rate-distortion-equivocation region
is directly obtainable from the rate-distortion curve because for
both problems the public and the private variables are the same
as a result of which the maximum achievable equivocation
is directly obtainable from the rate-distortion function. The
following theorem summarizes our result.
Theorem 7: For K = 1 databases, successive disclo-
sure with distortion-privacy pairs (D1, E1) and (D2, E2) are
achievable if and only if there exists a conditional distribution
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1
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1 1
1
ˆUser: ( ),
distortion 
n W
D
X
2 1
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( )
2
2  Refinement: 
index {1,2, ,2 }n R RW −∈ …
2 1 2
2
ˆUser: ( , ),
distortion 
n W W
D
X
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1
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1
1  Query: 
index {1,2, ,2 }nRW ∈ …
1 1
1
1
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2
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Fig. 2. Successive Refinement and Successive Disclosure Problems.
p (xˆ1, xˆ2|x) with
E
[
g
(
X, Xˆk
)]
≤ Dk, k = 1, 2, (12)
such that
R (Dk, Ek) = I(X ; Xˆk), k = 1, 2, (13)
and X − Xˆ2 − Xˆ1 form a Markov chain, i.e.,
p (xˆ1, xˆ2|x) = p (xˆ2|x) p (xˆ1|xˆ2) . (14)
Thus, for these two special but fundamentally important
problems, we can show that the Markov conditionX−Xˆ2−Xˆ1
(see Fig. 2) required for successive refinement [20, Theorem
2] also hold here and in fact suffices to satisfy the successive
disclosure requirement of no additional rate or privacy leak-
age. More work is needed to address questions such as the
practical implications of the above Markov condition [21] and
generalizing the solution to arbitrary sources.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented an abstract model for databases with an
arbitrary number of public and private variables, developed
application-independent privacy and utility metrics, used rate
distortion theory to determine the fundamental utility-privacy
tradeoff limits, and introduced a successive disclosure problem
to study utility-privacy tradeoffs and determine the conditions
for no privacy loss for multiple query data sources. Future
work includes generalizing the results to distributed data
sources and relating current approaches in computer science
and our universal approach.
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